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CASE SUMMARIES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Departmentof Social Services, 879 F.2d 789
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Amisub (PSL), Inc. ("Hospitals"), as Medicaid providers,
appealed from ajudgment that defendant, Colorado Department of Social Services ("Colorado") and its executive director did not violate a
provision of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (the "Act"), for reimbursement of inpatient hospital services.
The Tenth Circuit sustained the district court's holding that jurisdiction was properly based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and not on the federal
mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which does not afford relief
against states. The court also held that pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(13)(A), Hospitals had enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and had standing to challenge the reimbursement rates under
the Colorado Medicaid Plan. The court held, however, that the eleventh
amendment barred suit against Colorado since Colorado did not waive
sovereign immunity and Congress did not abrogate it by unmistakable
language in the Act. Colorado was dismissed as a defendant, but the
executive director was not.
The court held that the district court mistakenly applied the federal
agency "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review to the executive
director's findings. The appropriate standard of review for a state
agency's decision is a determination as to whether it procedurally and
substantively complied with the Act and its implementing regulations.
The court reversed the district court, and held that the executive director should have engaged in a finding procedure that allowed her to assure that all federal requirements had been met. The court also held that
the substantive results reached by the executive director did not reimburse Hospitals adequately. The court reversed and remanded.
Asarco, Inc. v. FederalMine Safety and Health Review Commission, 868 F.2d
1195
Author: Judge McWilliams
A miner was injured while working at a mine site which was operated by defendant, Asarco. An inspector from the plaintiff, Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission ("Commission"), issued Asarco a
citation for violating a mandatory safety standard. This citation was issued despite the fact that the injured miner was the violator of the safety
standard. Asarco appealed the citation and civil penalty, claiming it was
not at fault nor were its employees. The Commission upheld the decision of the safety inspector, and Asarco appealed.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Commission's ruling, finding that
fault is not required by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.

Consequently, when a mandatory safety standard has been violated, the
operator of a mine is assessed a civil penalty regardless of fault. The Act

provides, however that lack of negligence will be considered when determining the amount of the civil penalty.
Baker v. Bowen, 886 F.2d 289
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Baker, appealed a determination by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("Secretary"), as affirmed by the district
court, that Baker was not disabled for the purposes of Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-85. Baker argued that the Secretary, acting through an
administrative law judge ("A.LJ."), failed to consider certain x-rays and
that the Secretary's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, directing the A.LJ. to
procure consultative x-rays as well as Baker's medical records- from her
treating physician. The court held that the Secretary erred by not considering all relevant medical evidence and by not ordering medical tests
and records. The court found ambiguity in whether the A.LJ. considered Baker's x-rays, and reversible error in the Secretary's assumption
of what the A.LJ. considered. The Secretary failed to meet its burden to
fully and fairly develop the record.
Colorado Department of Labor and Employment v. United States Department of
Labor, 875 F.2d 791
Author: Judge Anderson
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the administrative law
judge A.L.J. ordering the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment ("Colorado") to pay the United States Department of Labor
("DOL") $405,659 for misspending of federal money granted the state
agency under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of
1973 ("CETA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. (repealed 1982).
Following an audit of fourteen CETA grants, the DOL Grant Officer
disallowed Colorado's expenditure of $563,271 of CETA funds.
Through negotiations, the disallowance was reduced to $405,659. Colorado disputed the findings and appealed the A.L.J.'s decision ordering
Colorado to pay this amount to the DOL.
The four findings in dispute were that Colorado: (1) failed to document certain expenditures properly; (2) failed to receive authorization
on a cost overrun covered by the federal government; (3) exceeded specific budget ceilings by more than fifteen percent without obtaining
prior approval; and (4) failed to request prior approval from the regional administrator or grant officer for each purchase by a subrecipient
of video equipment exceeding $500 per unit. Upon review, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the A.L.J.'s decision on all four findings.
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Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 890
F.2d 1121
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Colorado Interstate Gas Company ("CIG"), challenged
conditions imposed by defendant, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), on FERC's approval of three of CIG's applications for
certificates of public convenience and necessity under section 7(c) of the
Natural Gas Act ("NGA"), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c). In all three cases, FERC
limited the duration of the certificates to either one year or until CIG
accepted a blanket certificate, instead of approving the longer terms
CIG had requested. Additionally, in one application, FERC required
that CIG charge a higher transport rate than it had proposed. In the
same application, FERC also refused to certify the firm transport service
CIG requested and limited CIG to providing interruptible service only.
CIG contended that all the conditions were arbitrary and capricious, and
attacked the rate conditions as beyond FERC's statutory authority under
the NGA.
The Tenth Circuit found that CIG could challenge the blanket certificate acceptance limitation on appeal because it did not argue this limitation's invalidity in its requests for rehearing below. Regarding the
one-year fixed term limitation, the court held that CIG's acceptance of a
blanket certificate prior to the running of the one-year limits in all three
certificates rendered the issue moot. The rate condition imposed on one
certificate's approval was also moot since the certificate expired when
CIG accepted a blanket certificate. Lastly, the issue of denial of firm service was moot due to CIG's acceptance of blanket certificates: The court
vacated the orders under review in each case.
Community Action of Laramie County, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 347
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Community Action of Laramie County ("CALC"), was a
grantee agency of the federally funded Head Start program. The defendant, Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), funded
and set regulations for each grantee agency. HHS terminated CALC's
funding for violating federal regulation. After a series of unsuccessful
administrative reviews, CALC appealed to the federal district court
where it received a favorable ruling. HHS appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found that there was no law for the court to apply because no substantive guidelines existed for the agency to follow in
deciding whether to withdraw funding. Consequently, the court held
that it did not have the authority to review because it did not have standards against which to judge the exercise of discretion by HHS. Furthermore, the court stated that funding determinations are unsuitable for
judicial review. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to
dismiss the complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
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Dean v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 948
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Dean, sought a declaratory judgment that she is entitled to
the proceeds of her deceased husband's Federal Employees' Group Life
Insurance policy, although he had filed a change of designated beneficiary with his employer prior to his death. The district court found that
federal law preempts a state court order prohibiting a change of designated beneficiary, and Dean appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the Federal Employee's Group Life Insurance Act ("FEGLIA"), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 8701-8716, established a preemptive scheme. The regulation accompanying FEGLIA, 5 C.F.R. 870.901 (1986), contains language stating
that an employee's right to change beneficiaries cannot be waived or
restricted. The court held that since the state court order restricted the
federal insured's right to designate a beneficiary, it cannot be valid
under FEGLIA. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants.
Dozier v. Bowen, 891 F.2d 769
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Dozier, sought review of the denial of his application for
Social Security disability benefits. After his application was administratively denied on review by an administrative law judge A.LJ. whose decision became the Secretary's final decision in the matter. Dozier filed a
request for additional time within which to file an action for judicial review in district court 125 days after the date of the Secretary's decision.
The Appeals Council denied this request. Seven months after the date
of the Secretary's decision, Dozier filed suit in district court under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the Secretary's decision. The district
court dismissed because the action had not been filed within sixty days
of the Secretary's decision as required by section 405(g).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the basis that the action was not fied
within the statutory time limit. The court also held that the Appeals
Council's denial of Dozier's request for additional time within which to
seek judicial review was itself not subject to federal judicial review. Dozier did not fall under the exception that there may be federal judicial
review when the Secretary's denial of a petition to reopen is challenged
on constitutional grounds. The court found that the A.LJ. did not make
his decision in an unconstitutional manner even though he used a posthearing medical advisor which Dozier was not permitted to cross-examine. This was not unconstitutional because the interrogatories sent to
the medical advisor were also made available to Dozier and no objection
to the medical advisor's opinion was made on the record.
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Drury Inn-Colorado Springs v. Olive Co., 878 F.2d 340
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Drury Inn, purchased a portion of a tract of land from the
defendant, Olive Company. The purchase contract contained a restrictive covenant which provided that Olive would not sell any portion of
the remaining land to potential competitors whose room rates were
within twenty percent of Drury's rates.
Drury filed an action for damages for Olive's alleged breach of the
restrictive covenant. The district court granted Olive's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the restrictive covenant constituted
a per se violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 6-4-101 (1973).
The Tenth Circuit held that per se violations of the Sherman Act
are found in horizontal price fixing, boycotts, and tying arrangements.
The court could not say that this particular restrictive convenant was a
per se violation against price fixing. The court reversed the district
court's order for summary judgment and remanded the case for disposition of the claim on Olive's alleged breach.
Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Fowler, appealed from an order of the district court which
affirmed the Secretary of Health and Human Services' ("Secretary") determination that Fowler received an overpayment of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. The Secretary also determined that Fowler
was not without fault in causing the overpayment and therefore, the
overpayment could not be waived. Fowler asserted that the decision was
not based on substantial evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the Secretary's final decision only to
determine whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The court noted that it could not weigh the evidence nor substitute its
discretion for that of the agency. Giving great deference to the administrative law judge's (A.LJ.) determination of Fowler's credibility, the
court held that there was substantial evidence to support the Secretary's
determination that Fowler's initial application for benefits involved
fraud or similar fault. The evidence also supported the A.LJ.'s finding
that Fowler was engaged-in substantial gainful activity as an insurance
agent and as a manager of his corporation during the time he received
benefits. Consequently, Fowler was not without fault in continuing to
accept the disability benefits. The district court's decision was affirmed.
Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F.2d 788
Author: Judge Brorby
The district court issued an order of summary judgment for defendant, Lyng, Secretary of United States Department of Agriculture
("Lyng"), in a complaint filed by. plaintiff, Gallegos, Secretary of New
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Mexico Human Service Department ("Gallegos"). The district court
found that the Department of Agriculture's food stamp mail loss tolerance regulation, 7 C.F.R. § 274.3(c)(4), was not arbitrary or capricious
and was promulgated by the Food and Nutrition Service ("FNS"), in
accordance with law. The district court also issued an order prohibiting
Lyng from charging the State of New Mexico interest on the unpaid
amounts assessed under the regulation. Gallegos appealed the summary
judgment, and Lyng cross-appealed the order prohibiting interest
assessment.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's legal conclusions, but limited the review of FNS's administrative action within the
confines of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 ("APA").
This section of the APA sets the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review as not allowing the court to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency. The court held that the mail loss regulation was
clearly consistent with the language of its authorizing statute, section
2016(f) of the Food Stamp Act, and reasonably related to its purposes.
In addition, the court held that FNS satisfied the notice and comment
requirements of the APA, and that the rule was supported by substantial
evidence when considering the record as a whole. Moreover, the court
stated that the Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3701(c), did
not abrogate the FNS's federal common-law right to assess interest on
outstanding debts incurred by New Mexico pursuant to the Food Stamp
Act. The court reversed the district court's holding regarding the interest assessment issue, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment
consistent with this opinion.
Garcia v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 869 F.2d 1413
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Mrs.Garcia, sought review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board ("Board") affirming the denial of black lung disability benefits to her late husband, Simon Garcia. Defendant, Director of the Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs for the United States Department
of Labor, claimed that the decision of the administrative law judge A.LJ.
to deny benefits under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969 was proper because Mr. Garcia had failed to prove total disability
as required by the Act. On appeal, the Board found the A.LJ.'s decision
supported by substantial evidence and affirmed.
Under the 1969 Act, the Tenth Circuit noted that the "total disability" requirement that triggers payment of disability benefits is satisfied
by abnormal results of either pulmonary function studies or arterial
blood gas tests. The court found that since Garcia's blood gas test resuits were described as markedly and grossly abnormal by two physicians, and the Director failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of total disability, the Board erred in denying Garcia benefits. Thus, the Court reversed the Board's decision and remanded for
further proceedings.
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Hayes v. Unified School District No. 377, 87 7 F.2d 809
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant, Unified School
District No. 377 ("School District"), for the placement of their children
in "time-out" rooms for in-school suspension. The district court
granted the School District's motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed. The School District cross-appealed contending that the
action should be dismissed because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the Education of the Handicapped
Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1970).
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in proceeding to
the merits of the federal constitutional and state law claims because the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required
under the EHA. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f) (1986), states that the EHA is not the exclusive remedy available to handicapped students seeking public education benefits. This
amendment, however, is clear in preserving the requirement that if relief
can be sought under the EHA, exhaustion of the EHA's administrative
remedies is necessary before an action can be brought in federal court.
The Tenth Circuit held that because proper conduct and education
are intertwined, the discipline of a child in the classroom, including
"time-out" periods, is a matter that relates to the public education of
handicapped children and, therefore, falls within the scope of the EHA.
Thus, the plaintiffs were required to present their complaints concerning the disciplinary action according to procedures set forth by the EHA.
The court reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to dismiss the action for lack ofjurisdiction.
Hill v. National TransportationSafety Board, 886 F.2d 1275
Author: Judge Tacha

Petitioner, Hill, sought review of a decision of the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") upholding a Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") order suspending his pilot certificate due to violations
of 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(d), 91.9 (1988). Hill argued that the NTSB erred in
dismissing because both of the incidents for which he was sanctioned
involved purely intrastate flights and occurred outside the airspace controlled by the FAA, and therefore the FAA lacked jurisdiction to suspend his certificate.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The term "air commerce" is to be
broadly construed and not restricted to interstate flights occurring in a
controlled airspace. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(4) requires only the potential
for pilot conduct to endanger safety to support the FAA's order of suspension. Hill also submitted to the FAA's jurisdiction by holding a pilot
certificate issued by the FAA. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) gives the FAA
broad discretion to suspend a pilot's certificate as a result of any exami-

610

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:4

nation where the Secretary of Transportation determines that safety in
air transportation and public interest requires.
Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance v. Dole, 871 F.2d 943
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance ("Lake Hefier"), sought
a reversal of a federal highway administrative decision allowing the construction of a six lane urban freeway in Oklahoma City. The district
court granted defendants'; Elizabeth Dole, joined by the City of
Oklahoma and the Oklahoma City Municipal Improvement Authority
("Oklahoma City"), motion for summary judgment. Lake Hefner appealed, arguing that the district court erred in indicating that Lake Hefner had some burden of proof.
The Tenth Circuit agreed that, in resisting a motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party only has a burden to identify specific facts
posing genuine issues of material fact. In response to Oklahoma City's
motion, Lake Hefier did not set forth specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial. Because the court was not persuaded of Lake Hefner's
issues raised as grounds for reversal, and because Lake Hefier did not
raise any genuine issues of fact, the court affirmed the summary
judgment.
Lombardi v. Small Business Administration, 889 F.2d 959
Author: Judge Daugherty, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Lombardi, was terminated from his employment with the
Small Business Administration. The district court dismissed his Bivens
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Lombardi was a
federal employee whose claims were governed by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA").
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
established a cause of action for damages against a federal official for
unconstitutional conduct. However, based on United States Supreme
Court precedent, the court declined to create a judicial remedy when a
comprehensive statutory scheme, such as the CSRA, already provided
meaningful remedies against the United States.
Lopez v. Sullivan, 882 F.2d 1533
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Lopez, filed a motion for remand and reevaluation of his
disability claim after denial of benefits by the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). Upon reevaluation, and pursuant to the new criteria of the
Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-460, 98
Stat. 1794 ("Reform Act") (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.), Lopez was found eligible for disability benefits. Upon a
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favorable ruling by the SSA, Lopez filed a motion for attorney's fees,
which was denied. Lopez subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Reform Act did not require
remand of those cases decided before its enactment. Therefore, the
court stated that it was impossible to decide whether the remand was
due to a misinterpretation of the Reform Act, or whether Lopez's successful remand was due to the merits of his case. Because it was impossible to decide whether Lopez's success was due to the merits of his case,
the court was unable to determine whether Lopez was a "prevailing
party" and thereby entitled to attorney's fees. The court remanded Lopez's case to determine if he would have prevailed on the merits, thus
allowing an award of attorney's fees.
Mitchelson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 880 F.2d
265
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Mitchelson, applied for benefits under the Black Lung
Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901-45 ("Act"). He alleged total disability due
to the contraction of pneumoconiosis during long-term employment in
one of the nation's coal mines. The administrative law judge ("A.Lj.")
determined that because Mitchelson met one of the four medical requirements, he was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Defendant, Kemmerer Coal
Company, introduced evidence rebutting Mitchelson's claim of eligibility. Mitchelson challenged the finding that he was not totally disabled by
pneumoconiosis.
The Tenth Circuit held that the A.LJ.'s decision was supported by
substantial evidence and was in accord with the statutory and regulatory
law. Although Mitchelson was entitled to an initial presumption of total
disability, he failed to prove either total or partial disability from his coal
mine employment, as is required by the Act.
Peterson v. Wichita, 888 F.2d 1307
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Peterson, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq. (1982) (Title VII), alleging that the City of Wichita, Kansas, had illegally discharged him on the basis of race. In Kansas, a deferral state, a
Title VII claimant must file a discrimination charge within 300 days of
the alleged unlawful act under oath or affirmation as required by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Peterson filed a timely complaint with the EEOC,
but he did not verify the complaint until after 300 days had elapsed.
The district court refused to apply an EEOC regulation implementing
Title VII, which provides that an amendment to cure a defect in a
charge, including failure to verify the charge, relates back to the date the
charge was first received. Peterson appealed.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit reasoned
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that the EEOC regulation does not frustrate the-purpose for the statute's verification requirement, which is to protect employers from frivolous claims, because the EEOC does not investigate a charge until it is
verified. In addition, while satisfying section 2000e-5(b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite, filing a timely EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit. The court held that the regulation could be applied
when, as here, the defendant alleges no prejudice from its operation.
RailroadCommission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 874 F.2d
1338
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff Watkins, appealed a decision of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), which stated that Watkins violated the National Gas Policy Act ("NGPA"). The FERC found that Watkins sold
natural gas at a price in excess of the statutorily established maximum
price. Watkins objected, arguing that the FERC exceeded its statutory
jurisdiction by inquiring into geological structures underlying the subject acreage, gas-oil contact within specific wells, and properties of hydrocarbons from those wells. Watkins also asserted that the FERC
should not have been allowed to gather additional evidence when the
administrative law judge previously ruled that the evidence against him
was inconclusive. Watkins further asserted that the FERC's findings
were not based on substantial evidence. Moreover, Watkins claimed that
the FERC's conclusions of law were erroneous because the Railroad
Commission of Texas' ("RCT") guidelines were satisfied.
The Tenth Circuit held that the FERC inquiries into production and
gathering areas of Watkins gas-oil well operations were necessary. The
court reasoned that these inquiries enabled the FERC to enforce its responsibilities. Furthermore, the court acted within its statutory jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the FERC had a duty to act on a record
that was complete. Moreover, the FERC acted correctly in conducting
an additional investigation. The FERC conclusions of law were found to
be reasonable and rationally related to the facts. Also, the court found
the FERC's decision to be based on relevant factors. The court noted
that the FERC was not required to follow the RCT procedures. Consequently, the court affirmed FERC's finding of a NGPA violation.
Reppy v. Department of the Interior, 874 F.2d 728
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Reppy, appealed the district court's affirmance of the Interior Board of Land Appeals' ("Board") decision. The Board rejected
Reppy's challenge to a denial of his oil and gas lease application. The
Board reasoned that Reppy failed to comply with an administrative regulation. Reppy was the recipient of an oil and gas lease in a random
computer drawing. His lease application was rejected by the Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM") for failure to disclose the name of the filing
service he used as required by BLM regulation 43 C.F.R. § 3112.2-4.
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The Tenth Circuit first considered the Department of the Interior's
claim that the request for judicial review was time-barred by the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 226-2. This section states that no action
contesting a decision of the Secretary of the Interior involving any oil or
gas lease shall be maintained unless the action is commenced within
ninety days after the Secretary's final decision. The court reasoned that a
timely petition for reconsideration toils the ninety-day limitations period, thus preserving the right to judicial review of an administrative decision while petitioning the agency for reconsideration. In so holding,
the court overruled its decision in Geosearch, Inc. v. Hodel, 801 F.2d 1250
(10th Cir. 1986). The court next considered the merits of the case and
held that the rejection of the lease application was proper. The court
concluded that BLM's requirement of strict adherence to policies and
procedures furthered the statutory purpose of operating the public leasing program in a fair and equitable manner, and was not applied to
Reppy arbitrarily.
Walker OperatingCorp. v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission, 874 F.2d
1320
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Walker Operating Corporation ("Walker"), oil well operators, petitioned for review a ruling of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC"). This ruling stated that Walker violated the National Gas Act ("NGA"), by diverting natural gas dedicated to interstate
commerce and selling that gas at a price exceeding the statutory maximum. Walker appealed, arguing that the FERC exceeded its statutory
jurisdiction and impermissibly impinged upon areas reserved for state
regulation. In particular, Walker argued that: (1) the FERC was precluded from inquiring into the scope of the Walker's natural gas
reserves, which were dedicated to interstate commerce; (2) the FERC
was precluded from inquiring into the scope of Texas' pricing determinations covering its wells; (3) the FERC's conclusions were not based on
substantial evidence that Walker was producing oil above the gas-oil
contact line; and (4) the FERC erred in its conclusion concerning the
definition of "casinghead" gas under Texas law.
First, the Tenth Circuit found sufficient evidence to establish that
Walker violated the NGA by producing gas dedicated to interstate commerce and selling it at rates above the ceiling. Second, the court ruled
that the FERC reasonably interpreted the definition of "casinghead" gas
under Texas law as being gas below the gas-oil contact. Third, the court
held that the FERC had jurisdiction to inquire into the scope of an interstate natural gas producer's reserves above the gas-oil contact. Fourth,
the court held that the FERC had jurisdiction to inquire into the scope
of Texas' pricing determinations covering oil wells located on the same
surface. The court held that such examination was necessary background to the application of relevant federal statutes. The court, therefore, affirmed the FERC finding of an NGA violation.
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Wall v. United States, 871 F.2d 1540 Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Wall, filed an action in district court based on age discrimination and handicap discrimination following termination of his employment from the Department of Health and Human Services
("Department"). Wall sought review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board's ("Board") holding that Wall "voluntarily" left his employment
with the Department. The Board dismissed Wall's claim for lack ofjurisdiction because voluntary retirement is not an adverse action which is
appealable. Wall appealed the district court's subsequent dismissal of
his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit found that Wall's voluntary retirement gave the
court exclusive jurisdiction to review the Board's ruling, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. §§ 7702-7703(b)(1)-(2). Affirming the decree, the court found
that the district court properly construed the statutes, and properly dismissed Wall's de novo action in the district court.
Webb v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1252
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Webb, brought an action against defendants to reinstate
her deceased husband's mining claims located on federal land. The
claims were previously voided by the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") because of Webb's employment with the BLM. Defendants
appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that to set aside the Interior Board of
Land Appeals' ("IBLA") decision, it must find that their actions were
arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. The court considered the plain meaning of the statute 43 U.S.C. § 11 in determining congressional intent on the scope of control the IBILA and the BLM were
meant to have over employee spouses. The court found no such authority in either the statute or regulation 43 C.F.R. § 20.735. Therefore, the
revocation of the mining claims by the IBLA under the regulation was
arbitrary and capricious as there was insufficient evidence to establish
the "indirect interest" required under the statute. Finally, the court
stated that even if the employee of BLM had the indirect interest
needed, it would grant the authority to void only the employee's claims,
and not her spouse's.
Williams Natural Gas Co. v. City of Oklahoma, 890 F.2d 255
Author: Judge Brorby
An Oklahoma state court enjoined construction of a pipeline by
plaintiff Williams Natural Gas Company ("Williams"), despite the authority of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") certificate directing Williams to construct the pipeline. The federal district
court refused to contravene the state court injunction.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the district
court erred. Specifically, the court held that judicial review under section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b), is exclusive in the
federal courts of appeal once the FERC certificate issues. Thus, the statute barred collateral attack in either the state or federal district courts of
those issues that could have been raised in the FERC proceeding or
appeal.

